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Highlights 
• Millennium Village Projects are conceptualised as assemblage 
• Sauri Millennium Village failed to achieve its objectives, fractured the community and 
faded into oblivion. 
• The farmers trust their own assembling of ‘local’ resources and organisational 
frameworks. 
• SMV assembled success through questionable and limited reporting to only success 
stories and concealing data. 
 
Abstract  
Millennium Villages Project (MVP) was implemented in various villages across sub-Saharan 
African countries to catalyse the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
and provide evidence of step-wise societal transformation by 2015. This paper critically 
analyses from an assemblage perspective the MVP’s ‘quick win’ strategy to achieve the MDGs 
with a focus on the implementation of agricultural interventions and their impacts on the socio-
technical fabric in Sauri Millennium Village (SMV) in western Kenya. Our anatomy of MVP 
highlights that MVP is a continuation of a decades-long of development approaches that sets 
out to fix development.. Analysis of our qualitatively collected longitudinal data show that the 
SMV was blind to individual and collective forms of agency and heterogeneity among the social 
actors; hence grassroots corruption, elite capture of agricultural inputs, injury of social relations 
and exacerbation of the existing inequalities within the community. It spawned tensions and 
suspicions within the community. The farmers reworked the introduced ideas and technologies 
to fit to their needs and actively engaged with their own locally produced and exchanged 
resources. Typical for SMV was also an extremely questionable style of reporting that hid its 
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achievements and failures from the general public. The “Big Promise” that MVP would deliver 
did not materialise; it simply failed to achieve its objectives and was unable to learn from 
previous interventionist strategies, it fractured communities and faded into oblivion. 
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1. Introduction 
World development history is characterised by a succession of interventionist development 
strategies which have in common the intention to reduce poverty and create conditions for 
sustained economic growth by increasing institutional and technical efficiencies. The 
underlying discourses of planned development have remained largely unchanged over the years. 
This fortified continuities rather than generating robust discontinuities (Escobar, 2011: 21-54), 
while new development questions and challenges such as enduring poverty, malnutrition, child 
mortality, insecurity have emerged since then. Continuities at the level of development 
discourse to expand and deepen the processes of ‘modernisation’ (Arce and Long, 2000) 
through planned interventions are well present in the Millennium Village Project (MVP). 
Wilson (2013, 2015) perceives MVP likewise as a prime example of social engineering of a 
‘model village-style social experiment’ and again as ‘a living laboratory’ whereby massive 
investments are made in integrated programmes at village level through planned interventions 
within a specific timeframe. 
The MVP is a high-profile project implemented with substantial financial and ideological 
support from the United Nations, political celebrities, business elites and academia to accelerate 
achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). MVP was piloted in 2005 in two 
villages in sub-Saharan Africa and up-scaled to about ten in 2007 and since then to 80 villages. 
Over the years, these projects have been praised for achieving considerable progress in the 
fields of education, health and, notably, smallholder agriculture (Sanchez, 2006; Sanchez et al., 
2007; Nziguheba et al., 2010; Denning et al., 2009; Deckelbaum et al., 2006; Pronyk et al., 
2012). MVP and more generally the MDGs, however, have been subjected to critical 
evaluations (Easterly, 2009; Hulme, 2009, 2010.) MVP has specifically been critiqued for not 
disclosing project data for independent, objective analyses (Clemens and Demombynes, 2011, 
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2013) and not achieving impact despite massive funding (Wilson, 2013, 2015, 2016; Wanjala 
and Muradian, 2013; Carr, 2008; Clemens et al., 2007). Other have argued that purpose of most 
development interventions is to further capitalism and entrepreneurial values in various ways 
(Umans and Arce, 2014: 342) and to extend processes of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ 
(Wilson, 2016; Harvey, 2009). This paper sets out from an assemblage perspective to contribute 
to a critical and reflexive analysis of the MVP and to explore, for instance, why, and how, 
despite that the outcomes and impact of MVP are questionable, it managed to legitimize 
continuous external funding to carry out its activities. 
Building on the body of literature on assemblage and (re)assembling processes, we pursue here 
this analytic to explore the dynamics generated by the MVP and more specifically the SMV. 
We unravel MVP as an assemblage of people, discourse, technologies and other material 
elements; these are brought together to address societal problems and needs. This allows us 
conceptualising MVP as an assemblage that attempts to transform existing assemblages; an 
assemblage that claims to help create assemblages that strengthen and improve rural livelihoods 
and reduce poverty in this way. MVP can also be branded as an assemblage that sets out to fix 
solutions for problems through planned development (Umans and Arce, 2014) or through what 
Li (2007a, 2007b) has qualified as ‘rendering technical’. Solution fix and rendering technical 
are among the practices that  Li (2007a: 263) has classified as ‘generic to any assemblage’ and 
they are analysed as such. These practices express rather similar processes and are therefore 
used interchangeably here. Typical for such practices is that the style is interventionist, rather 
linear and bound by time and space. 
Sauri Millennium Village (SMV) serves as an extended case. Sauri is the site were MVP was 
first piloted in Africa. SMV is important for the upscaling of MVP to other countries and would 
generate viable lessons for the international development community. We decided to focus our 
analysis on the agricultural interventions taking place in SMV. The primary objective on 
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balance was to eliminate hunger, although ‘improving agriculture in itself is unlikely to get 
rural communities in sub-Saharan Africa out of poverty’ (Nziguheba et al. 2010: 111; Sachs, 
2005; Sanchez 2005). Sauri also offers the opportunity to draw on unique longitudinal data 
from a series of ongoing field studies in the region in which Sauri is situated from 1996 up to 
the present, that is, well before SMV was designed and implemented. These studies depict what 
generally characterises Sauri’s assemblage before SMV was launched in 2005. They underscore 
that the people in Sauri noticeably share a history of distancing from the products of previous 
interventionist strategies. They have a strong tendency to continue to trust and rely on their own 
resources, whose use is embedded in locally shared and accepted cultural norms, and to 
reproduce what they can and share among themselves. This is not necessarily out of poverty 
which in the MVP and MDG conceptualisation of development is the condition whereby people 
lack the capital means to purchase the newest agricultural inputs and to engage with mainstream 
markets. They do engage with markets that they construct themselves and tend to enrich the 
key human and non-human resources themselves (Hebinck et al., 2015; Kimanthi, 2014; Mango 
and Hebinck, 2004; Mango, 2002; van Kessel, 1998).  
Our longitudinal data and interpretations thereof permit us to pinpoint which processes at play 
explain why MVPs, and SMV in particular, fail to turn farmers into entrepreneurs attaining 
surplus yields for the market by making use of proven inputs made accessible through formal 
organisations such as the cooperatives. We elaborate on how SMV became vulnerable to an 
elite capture of inputs, injured social relations, exacerbated the existing inequalities and thus 
fractured the community. We also show how the SMV’s approach to fixing food [production] 
in Sauri was concomitant with the ambition to show success - a ‘twisted’ way of fixing 
solutions, resulting in questionable data reporting. 
The paper proceeds as follows: we first explain the conception of MVP and its implementation 
in countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The next sections discuss our ways of data collection and 
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shortly elaborate our methodology for analysis by explaining what we mean by assemblage and 
why MVPs and SMV can be conceptually unpacked as assemblage. What then follows is an 
analysis of how, and in what ways, SMV tried to assemble and display project success. The last 
section discusses against the background of the broader literature the specificities of MVP 
inspired assemblages. We particularly pay attention to farmers’ (re)assembling practices in 
response to SMV practices. In our concluding section, we reiterate the significance of our 
analysis for the study of agrarian development and promote, argue for and suggest more robust 
interventions that strengthen assemblages in which farmers, villages, communities are not the 
object of external interventions. Such assemblages potentially appreciate fully the capabilities 
of human and non-human actors within the villages as they do not relate to the villages as 
external actors. 
2. The birth and implementation of MVP in African countries 
The 1970’s saw the emergence of the Integrated Rural Development (IRD) approach to 
planning and development (ODI, 1979; Ellis and Biggs, 2001) which was soon followed in the 
1990’s by Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) (Stiglitz, 1999). IRD was a response to 
failures of previous technocratically conceived strategies like the Green Revolution whose 
impact was limited to those regions that are endowed with conducive natural and social 
conditions (Griffin, 1979; Pearse, 1980, 1977). IRD stood for widening the scope of 
development interventions beyond agriculture per se to include other economic sectors like 
education, health and physical infrastructure (ODI, 1979; Ellis and Biggs, 2001). It also called 
for proper (state) planning and participation of the less fortunate through mobilisation, income 
and assets redistribution and an increase in technical and institutional efficiencies in order to 
raise marketable production. All these served to ease the integration of subsistence farmers into 
the market economy to reduce poverty and in turn to enhance participation (Leupolt, 1977; Ellis 
and Biggs, 2001; Ashley and Maxwell, 2002). 
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SAPs, on the other hand, called for a retreat of the state as the donor community lost confidence 
in central planning and the key political and economic role of the state in the economy. State 
control would hinge too much on economic inefficiencies, restrictions, patronage and political 
prices rather than real prices. Trade-liberalisation, more space for the market and private 
property arrangements and entrepreneurship would trigger development. Stiglitz (1999) 
critiqued SAPs as being inadequate for not considering the ‘underlying factors’ of social life in 
the rural areas which prevented rural households from participating in the market. He showed 
that the need arises for a paradigm based on a broad conception of development that would 
allow for a broad and inclusive vision of development strategies, one that would assign 
international development assistance a different position and role which included a different 
way of delivery to the people. In short, the earlier development paradigms viewed development 
too narrowly and thus did not succeed (Stiglitz, 1999: 1-2). SAPs were succeeded by the 
international prestige project MDGs (Hulme 2009; Sachs, 2005; Sachs and McArthur, 2005; 
DFID, 2002).  
The MDGs were launched in 2000 by the world development leaders at the Millennium Summit 
as the next global development strategy that would make a difference. Initially, eight goals were 
formulated which would lead to the transformation of societies, reduce poverty and improve 
the standards of living across the globe by 2015 (Sanchez, 2006; Sanchez et al., 2007; Sachs, 
2005). The MDGs were designated as ‘the world’s biggest promise’ and deemed too important 
to fail (Wilson, 2013:2; Hulme, 2010:15). However, it was realised after some time that most 
countries in the Global South were not likely to achieve these goals by the year 2015. The then 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan commissioned the Millennium Project to formulate a 
strategy for the achievement of MDGs which were then implemented as Millennium Villages. 
MVP was born out of the perceived need to catalyse the achievement of the MDGs. Headed by 
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Jeffrey Sachs1 and assisted by former director of ICRAF, Pedro Sanchez, and associates from 
Earth University, MVP formed a ‘task force’ that included representatives of the World Bank, 
the IMF, UN and donor agencies, civil society organisations, the private sector and celebrities 
like Bono and Bill Gates (Binagwaho and Sachs, 2005; Carr, 2008; Sanchez et al., 2007; Hulme, 
2009; Kanter et al., 2009). The Earth Institute from the University of Columbia in the USA, 
played a key role in design of MVP. In Sachs’s words:  
‘All of the UN Millennium Project work has depended utterly on the Earth Institute. 
Fundamentally, progress on the MDGs rests on thorough scientific understanding of the 
underlying challenges of disease, food production, undernutrition, watershed management, 
and other related issues. These, in turn, require specialized expertise. Modern science has 
given us technological interventions, or specific techniques for addressing these problems, 
such as antimalarial bed nets or antiretroviral drugs’ (Sachs, 2005: 224). 
Wilson (2016:4) refers to the projects emanating from such configurations in which 
philanthropists play a central role as examples of ‘philanthrocapitalism’. ‘Unlike previous forms 
of charity and philanthropy, philanthrocapitalism claims to infuse its projects with the 
dynamism and innovation of capitalist enterprise’. Hence the strong focus on establishing and 
nurturing entrepreneurship and achieving measurable success. Development projects should 
moreover be based on scientific insights, goal-driven, realise quantifiable outputs and have a 
strategy in place to scale-up interventions to national and regional levels (Sachs, 2005; Sanchez, 
2006; Kanter et al. 2009; Wilson, 2013, 2016). It was also clearly felt that the MDGs were 
either not met or hardly met and certainly not fast enough achieved. MDGs made progress but 
more could be achieved provided they were properly targeted (Sachs and McArthur, 2005). The 
MVP model stipulates that poverty and hunger can only be reduced by accelerating the 
                                                 
1 Wilson (2014) devoted an entire book to Jeffrey Sachs clearly illuminating how Sachs’ career has evolved and 
why neoliberalism entices him. 
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transformation of the resource base of the societies and their economies in the Global South 
from reliance on the ‘traditional’ to adoption of the ‘modern’. This model would deliver and 
help articulate assemblages where all other previous approaches to development failed to do so 
(Sanchez, 2006; Sachs, 2005; Cabral et al., 2006; Sanchez et al. 2007; Kanter et al., 2009). 
MVP was thus launched, legitimised and positioned as an assemblage for empowering 
communities to invest in a package of integrated interventions that aim to increase food 
production, improve access to safe water, health care, education, and develop infrastructure. 
The process benefits from synergies of the integrated approach and relies on community 
leadership being empowered by scientifically proven technological inputs such as hybrid maize. 
MVPs were first implemented in sub-Saharan Africa from 2005 onwards, gradually expanding 
and up-scaling from 2 villages - Sauri in Kenya and Koraro in Ethiopia - to ten additional 
villages in Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda 
(Sanchez, 2006; Cabral et al. 2006). At a later stage MVP’s were carried out in 80 sub-Saharan 
villages (Kanter et al. 2009).  
The key MVP interventions of the agricultural sector were to deliver and introduce the 
agricultural inputs that would increase production and resonate with the prevailing agro-
ecological conditions. The villages where MVPs were implemented are said to have been 
carefully selected to represent each of the twelve principal agro-ecological zones and farming 
systems in Africa (Mutuo et al., 2007: 7; Sanchez et al., 2007). The MVP builds clearly on the 
Green Revolution strategy that set out to transform the agricultural sector through the 
introduction of a modern, scientifically proven agricultural technology package consisting of 
improved crop germplasm adapted to local conditions2 and fertilizer application combined with 
field-based extension (Nziguheba et al. 2010: 111). Additionally, MVP introduced ‘formal’ 
                                                 
2 This may be the formal position; in practice in Sauri it was hybrid maize seed that was provided (often on credit). 
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market organisations through which farmers would acquire inputs and sell their produce. It was 
thought that if organized into producers’ groups, farmers could negotiate higher prices and 
linkages to buyers (Nziguheba et al., 2010: 111). Sanchez (2006:3) spells out that to achieve 
success via this approach requires careful sequencing of interventions; a typical infusion of the 
classic Rostovian Stages of Growth perspective. Sanchez (2006: 3) framed it as  
‘getting out of the hunger/disease trap first is essential before one can move on to sell crop 
surpluses, enter the market’ and transform the economy. It was thought that for MVP to 
succeed, it would be essential to ‘fix the market infrastructure and combat trade and food 
aid distortion’.  
Those that contributed to the MVP-strategy simply assumed, as Hobart and many of his 
contemporaries argued, that  
‘a green-revolution-style breakthrough in smallholder farm productivity is central to 
escape the poverty trap throughout rural Africa and that an African Green Revolution is 
crucial for dual purposes; to tackle hunger and to kick-start rural economic growth by 
raising productivity and rural incomes’ (Hobart, 2002 :10).3 
3. Methodology and data collection 
The setting of this paper is the Sauri sub-location which is situated in the Yala division of Siaya 
County in western Kenya (Figure 1 and 2). As of 2004, Sauri became known to the outside 
world as the first Millennium Village. The specific focus of this paper on Sauri also lies in a 
number of important and additional reasons: 
                                                 
3 The Green Revolution is much debated among experts, academics, development agencies and lobby groups. It 
goes beyond the scope of this paper to extensively discuss whether or not the Green Revolution was successful in 
increasing the productivities of land and labour in Africa or whether it is relevant to speak of a ‘First’ or ‘ Second’ 
or even a ‘New’ Green Revolution. 
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Firstly, the emphasis on Sauri allows us to draw on findings from a series of ongoing 
longitudinal studies initiated in 1996 in Nyamninia, Muhanda, Muhoho and Sauri villages in 
the Yala division (Van Kessel 1998; Mango, 1996, 1999, 2002; Mango and Hebinck, 2004, 
2016; Hebinck, 2001; Hebinck and Mango, 2008 and Hebinck et al., 2015). The objective of 
these studies was to analyse and consider the dynamics generated over a longer period of time 
by a range of socio-technical interventions such as the Green Revolution, Agro-forestry and 
Zero-Grazing, what impacts these had on rural livelihoods and the social fabric in the villages, 
but also how these interventions were contested, re-assembled and negotiated at the household 
and field level to resonate with local conditions and shared preferences. Multiple qualitative 
methods of data collection were used, which included document and archival reviews, life 
history interviews, key informant interviews and interviews with farmers, ethnographic 
observations and case studies through revisits of the previously recorded cases.4 
 
[Insert Figure 1] 
Figure 1: Kenya and the location of Yala 
[Insert Figure 2] 
Figure 2: Sauri Millennium Village, a conglomerate of 11 villages. 
Source: Adapted from Mutuo et al. (2006: 6). 
Secondly, Sauri is situated in western Kenya, a region that has been subject to a range of 
interventions programmed, funded and implemented by the Colonial state as well as by the 
Kenya Government in collaboration with international donors and agencies after Independence 
                                                 
4 The value of revisits and restudies is widely acknowledged in social science studies, notably in anthropology and 
rural development sociology (Geertz, 1995; Long, 2001; Burawoy, 2003,  Li, 2014). 
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in 1963. The region and past and present interventions have been thoroughly studied and 
documented (Oguto, 1971; Hay 1972; Heyer, 1975; Obudho and Waller, 1976; Kitching, 1980; 
Carlsen, 1980; Cohen and Odiambo, 1989; Shipton, 1995; Crowley, 2000). These studies that 
also informed our longitudinal studies provide a historical and contemporary account of the 
processes of agrarian transformation. Despite being implemented in different historical and 
political circumstances, the intervention programmes all advocate for the transformation from 
‘subsistence’ to ‘commercial’ agriculture.  
Thirdly, the implementation of MVP in Sauri attracted independent researchers who wrote up 
their findings in unpublished Masters and Ph.D. theses (Haro, 2014; Wanjala, 2016; Yuksel, 
2013) and journal articles (Wanjala and Muradian, 2013). The objective of their studies was, 
like ours, to examine the MVP project from a critical, reflexive perspective. Whereas Wanjala 
(2016) was largely quantitative, Haro’s (2014) and our studies were largely qualitative. While 
their studies were time bound, our studies span a longer time frame. This allows for an ex-ante 
analysis and a strong focus on agricultural technology and processes of transformation and ex-
post. Together these studies delivered significant data, observations and in-depth insights into 
SMV. 
This paper specifically makes use of a two-month intense period of data collection in Sauri that 
was done for a master thesis (Kimanthi, 2014). It traced the impact of SMV on current maize 
and land use practices and extracted detailed accounts of how farmers experienced the 
implementation of SMV ‘from below’. New field studies are currently being carried out at the 
time of writing this paper. Field studies were combined with a desk study and a document 
review of MVP reports that became available to us during the course of fieldwork. The 
household and field levels formed the targets of the MVP interventions, and these are the levels 
where important processes of interactions with introduced technologies took place. A total of 
21 people were ‘formally’ interviewed in depth in 2014, 5 of whom were key informants and 
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16 of whom were farmers. Four farmers were part of previous studies (notably van Kessel, 1998 
and Mango, 2002). The other informants were selected randomly, purposively and through 
snowballing. They included those farmers who engaged actively with MVP activities, those 
who had withdrawn from or distanced themselves from using the introduced technologies and 
market channels, the members of newly formed grassroots initiatives, adopters and those who 
partly applied the recommended technologies. The key informants were purposively selected 
due to their knowledge of the MVP operations in Sauri as well as their interactions with the 
farmers. In addition to the ‘formal’ interviews, other respondents provided information that 
served as a confirmation or rather a data back-up of the ‘formal’ interviews. These respondents 
were ethnographically interviewed during the daily interactions with the people and participated 
in some of the village-level group meetings. Ethnographic observations were made as well.  
The 2014-restudy enabled us to compare our data and findings with the available data published 
in MVP reports and the recent studies by Wanjala (2016) and Haro (2014). It is important to 
note in advance that our efforts to access data through the official MVP channels from the field 
and regional offices in Sauri and Kisumu respectively bore no fruit and also that the MVP staff 
were not allowed to be interviewed by independent researchers who were not vetted by the 
leaders. However, our ethnographic explorations in Sauri and our prior knowledge of the village 
and region compensated for that. We also managed to access some confidential reports from 
SMV field staff and informal interviews with the field staff. 
An essential component of our methodology is the longitudinal studies, published in books 
papers, Master and Ph.D. theses and research and project reports, which enabled us to position 
SMV in a proper historical setting of the region and its people. The studies simultaneously 
furnished the key building blocks for an in-depth ex-ante and ex-post situational account and 
analysis of the dynamics generated by MVP. These studies clearly showed that neither past nor 
present development interventions to transform the socio-technical fabric endured; nor were 
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these well received and accommodated by people in the villages. Our ex-ante studies (Hebinck 
and Mango, 2008; Hebinck et al., 2015; Mango, 1996, 1999, 2002; Mango and Hebinck, 2004;) 
which show in detail the dynamics in agriculture within the area prior to MVP implementation 
give us the added advantage of comparing the ex-post and ex-ante situations.  
4. MVP as assemblage  
Based on the reading of the original work of Deleuze and Guattari (1987) by  Li (2007a), 
McFarlane (2009), Anderson and McFarlane (2011) and Woods (2015) we conceptualise 
assemblages as being made up of heterogeneous elements with varied properties that constantly 
interact with each other; they are continuously transforming and reproducing. Assemblages are 
the locally specific outcome of the interaction and mutual shaping of socio-cultural, institutional 
and non-human elements; these elements are continually rearranged though processes of 
reassembling to form new connections and relationships that may not have existed previously. 
Assemblages are dynamic and constantly changing. Assembling ‘can only ever be a provisional 
process: relations may change, new elements may enter, alliances may be broken, new 
conjunctions may be fostered’ (Anderson and McFarlane, 2011: 126). The SMV analysed here 
in detail is testimony of that dynamism. 
Viewing MVP as assemblage reconceptualises planned interventions as attempts to transform 
existing assemblages into new ones that promise to be internally more coherent, more 
productive and that strengthen existing livelihoods. The MVP assemblage consists of drawing 
and (re)assembling disparate elements together through various practices that are aimed at 
improvement (or believed to do so) by implementing various interventions for treatment of the 
diagnosed deficiencies such as hunger from low production ( Li, 2007a: 264). A clear objective 
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of MVP was to drastically transform the ‘sub-subsistence’5 farmers’ to a single ‘small-scale 
entrepreneurial community’ (Sanchez et al., 2009: 40; Sanchez, 2006; Nziguheba et al., 2010). 
Expert advice and extension services were geared towards helping farmers to produce a surplus 
so as to venture into markets. MVP relied heavily on technical assistance to the farmers such 
as providing commoditised technology packages and strengthening marketing relations. Such 
advice, knowledge, and institutions were positioned as superior to locally embedded knowledge 
and repertoires of social organisation and exchange. There was very little attention, if any, paid 
to, for instance, the existing local knowledges and cultures of seeds, the way local resources are 
enriched and exchanged, and the social relations in which maize production and consumption 
is embedded (Mango, 2002; Mango and Hebinck, 2004; Hebinck et al., 2015). Ignoring by not 
taking into consideration the prevailing conditions, history, prior interventions, individual and 
collective agency and generally the complexity of social situations is typical for MVP-inspired 
assemblages such as SMV. Not surprisingly, the implementation of concrete activities was met 
with suspicion at the ‘local’ level of village and community. Thus what MVP assemblage aims 
to articulate is also subjected to negotiation and reassembling, eventually altering the intended 
outcomes (see also Olivier de Sardan, 2006; Long, 2001, 1977) and ultimately the assemblage 
itself. A focus on assemblage and particularly on the reassembling practices shows the subtleties 
of the agency of the social actors involved, be they experts or ‘local people’. This in turn points 
to the limits of grand designs for development. 
 Li (2007a: 264 ff.) advances an analysis of assemblages through six practices that are generic 
to any assemblage: 1) forging alignments or networks; 2) rendering technical or solution-fix; 
3) authorizing knowledge; 4) managing failures; 5) anti-politics, and 6) reassembling. Applying 
such an assemblage analytic helps displaying the dynamic and changing nature of the SMV 
                                                 
5 The notion sub-subsistence is a term taken from the MVP vocabulary. It is needless to say that we find this an 
extremely problematic concept. 
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assemblage, its inherent problems and the contradictions it generates. An assemblage 
perspective clearly adds to the critical literature on MVP and to the more broader literature on 
planned interventions. It points at the subtleties of labelling regions, villages and people as 
‘underdeveloped’ and the ideology to further capitalism and entrepreneurial values in various 
ways (Umans and Arce, 2014: 342). But it also helps us show that MVP is more than just being 
captured by neoliberalism and extending processes of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (cf. 
Harvey, 2005, 2009) as Wilson (2016) frames MVP. The reassembling that is going on by 
SMV-staff but more importantly by quite a number of farmers in Sauri is testimony of that. 
They continue to rely on and enrich their seed practices based on selecting and planting local 
maize seed instead of the modern varieties that SMV introduced (Hebinck et al., 2015). An 
assemblage perspective allows us to demonstrate how MVP brings together numerous social 
actors (i.e. villagers, donors, experts, academics, project staff and traders), a range of objectives 
(poverty alleviation, sustainability, social transformation) and non-human actors (i.e. hybrid 
maize varieties, soils fertility technologies, cooperatives, new institutional arrangements) and 
how these interact. The interests and objectives of the social actors involved in SMV compose 
a dynamic but often conflictive mix. It allows us to analyse the problems inherent to ‘solution-
fix’ practices to solving problems by making the implicit assumptions more explicit and 
transparent. The role played by experts emerges as crucial in and for the assemblage; similarly 
the need to forge alignments between human and non-human actors to maintain the assemblage 
and to liaise with donors and dealing with the outside world by assembling success with the 
purpose to sustain the assemblage. MVP also requires global celebrities and specifically poor 
villages and poor people. The latter are crucially important as their problems and deficiencies 
need to be solved in turn legitimizing the existence and reproduction of the assemblage. In the 
words of Jeffrey Sachs while visiting Sauri for the first time in 2004, SMV was designed to:  
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‘(...) work(ing) with villagers to identify ways to help such communities to achieve the 
worldwide Millennium Development Goals of reducing extreme poverty, hunger, disease, 
and lack of access to safe water and sanitation’ (Sachs, 2005: 228). 
The MVP assemblage pivots on substituting the ‘traditional’ with the ‘modern’ or on inserting 
new and modern elements into existing assemblages. Characteristically, MVP creates space for 
interventions through the specific way communities and their resources are labelled and framed 
( Li, 2007a; Long, 2001; Umans and Arce, 2014). When people are labelled as ‘poor’ and their 
‘deficiency’ identified as a lack of human, financial and physical capital, this reinforces and 
institutionalises tags such as ‘poor farmers’, ‘impoverished people’, ‘inefficient traditional 
methods of farming’, ‘poor marketing strategies’, ‘low productivity’ and so on. Yet they are 
seen by others as resourceful. During his first visit to Sauri for example, Sachs frames Sauri as 
follows: 
‘The visit made vivid both why extreme poverty persists in rural areas and how it can be 
ended. We found a region beset by hunger, AIDS, and malaria. The situation is far grimmer 
than is described in official documents. The situation is also salvageable, but the 
international community requires a much better understanding of its severity, dynamics, 
and solutions if the crisis in Sauri and the rest of rural Africa is to be solved. The situation 
is best understood through the voices of Sauri's struggling residents. In response to an 
invitation from our group, more than two hundred members of the community came to 
meet with us one afternoon. Hungry, thin, and ill, they stayed for three and a half hours, 
speaking with dignity, eloquence, and clarity about their predicament. They are 
impoverished, but they are capable and resourceful. Though struggling to survive at 
present, they are not dispirited but determined to improve their situation. They know well 
how they could get back to high ground’ (Sachs, 2005: 227,228). 
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These are problematic labels and framings that are commonly applied and uncritically 
reproduced in reports by experts including those written by academics. Moreover, the data to 
sustain these framings and interpretations is derived from applying rather standardised 
assessments of the nature and robustness of the available human and non-human resources. 
These assessments are backed by engineering and natural sciences procedures which tend to 
interpret facts as given and objective rather than as constructed and negotiated. As a 
consequence, locally available resources that are found relevant by local people (e.g. their 
seeds, knowledge, experiences, culture, their interpretation of yield and nutrition) are 
overlooked and consequently labelled by experts as ‘unproductive’ and only rendering 
‘poverty’. Such labelling legitimises interventions that stress that the promises of development 
can only be fulfilled by introducing modern devices and procedures, new technologies, 
institutions, rules and regulations, and modern management systems. 
Experts (e.g. scientists, engineers, agronomists) play a key role in the everyday practice of the 
MVP assemblage: they help to design interventions and innovations and represent authorizing 
knowledge. Experts, moreover, combine claims to knowledge with a set of practices by which 
the development of the (agricultural) sector is directed; one in which problems are identified 
and solutions forged, proposed and implemented. Experts frame problems in terms amenable 
to technical solutions. These solutions fix the future as they typically have a forward-looking 
aspect, as van der Ploeg (2003: 229) describes in his analysis of Dutch agricultural expertise: it 
does not concern so much “agriculture as it is now, let alone (recent) agricultural history. The 
expertise involves agriculture as it is expected to look in the future.”. This provides experts 
potentially with the power to create “the rules that define and authorize participants” (van der 
Ploeg 2003: 22), and that distinguishes them from those who impede the assemblage.  
 Li (2007a, 2007b) captures this repertoire of thinking and assessment with the notion 
‘rendering technical’. This is rather similar to what Umans and Arce (2014) characterise as 
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‘solution-fix’. It understands framing problems as confined, knowable and controllable, 
implying in turn perceiving problems of development as solvable, but only once the right 
experts are called upon and their insights translated into action (Scott, 1998; see also Herbert-
Chesire and Higgins, 2004). The fixing of solutions simultaneously involves rendering non-
political; that is, the solutions that are pre-determined to solve the problem are perceived as 
non-contested. Moreover, the community or village for which the interventions are designed 
and targeted is conceptualised as homogenous (see Carr, 2008 on this misconception, an issue 
we will come back to later) and as representing an average practice and experience, even though 
the community or village is made up of heterogeneous groups and individuals with diverse 
interests, goals, knowledge, desires, and education. Nevertheless, African villages are 
misconceived as homogenous entities. 
However, as we will show in this paper, the assemblage that MVP desired to create did not 
materialise. Some of the local people responded to MVP interventions by retracting to their 
informal groups and informal market organisations as opposed to submitting to the introduced 
farmer cooperatives and cereal banking techniques. Furthermore, as MVP introduced 
technologies such as the newest hybrid maize seeds to the community to replace the preferred 
and trusted ‘local’ maize varieties (Van Kessel, 1998; Mango, 2002; Hebinck et al. 2015), it 
interfered with the way farmers organised themselves around food cultivation and potentially 
destabilising the existing assemblages. We show in this article that despite the intended 
stabilising effect of MVP, the farmers continue to organise themselves in ways that have always 
worked for them such as production based on localised cultural repertoires and institutions as 
well as on a strong belief in the locally available resources such as local maize varieties and 
soil fertility replenishment practices (Hebinck et al., 2015; Mango and Hebinck, 2016). In our 
opinion, it is not poverty per se that motivates people in Sauri to continue to develop and enrich 
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their resources such as the use of local maize varieties extensively and to draw from their own 
knowledge. 
The MVP model is in stark contrast to making or rather facilitating local actors to be subject of 
their own development that Umans and Arce (2014) depict as ‘fit-in-context’ (see also 
Chambers, 1997; Hyden, 1983). Such an approach to development implies fitting in a solution 
to a complex situation rather than moulding the local realities to fit into the set objectives that 
are formulated by non-local actors. Development or progress in this line of thinking is 
constituted by assemblages some of which unfold as promising but robust, and internally 
coherent and consistent.  
 
5. Assembling success: analysis of Sauri Millennium Village project 
This section critically elaborates on SMV strategies to demonstrate that success can be achieved 
within a short time. The focus in this section is on the practices of the SMV assemblage 
elaborated earlier as generic to assemblages. We will elaborate these practices by offering a 
closer look at SMV reveals 1) forging alignments through a compromised choice of project 
location and enticing farmers with free gifts and promises 2) rendering technical and 
authorizing knowledge practices which is depicted in our analysis of the agricultural 
interventions and 3) management of failure which is treated by an analysis of the SMV’s data 
secrecy as well as controversial reporting on the project. The reassembling aspect is dealt with 
in the next section. The depoliticising elements of assemblages are recapped in the concluding 
section. 
 
5.1 The choice of Sauri for MVP implementation 
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Sauri Millennium Village is made up of 11 smaller villages all of which are densely populated. 
It is an area with high potential for agriculture as it has a bimodal rainfall pattern that allows 
for a long and a short planting season a year. Water is readily available as there are natural 
springs across the villages in addition to the Yala river all of which never dries up (Mutuo et 
al., 2007). Nonetheless, Sauri is one of the areas that have been receiving financial assistance 
from international organisations for more than two decades now. ICRAF began research in the 
sub-location in the early 1990s in partnership with the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute 
(KARI) and Kenya Forestry Institute (KEFRI). Africa Now, which is a UK based charity 
organisation, worked with the communities in the late 1990s to support the building of spring-
protection cisterns. CARE-Kenya and Heifer International also worked in the 1990s while the 
MVP started operating in 2004. Schlesinger (2007) argued that Sauri should not have been such 
an ideal choice for a site where ‘an experiment’ that aimed at poverty alleviation of the ‘poorest 
of the poor’ was to be carried out given that the development interventions had been ongoing 
on in the same area. She wondered: ‘if one were truly attempting to establish a representative 
baseline of data for the MVP model, would it not be more logical to choose an untouched 
locale?’ (Schlesinger, 2007: 2)6. However, it is claimed that Sauri was selected on the basis of 
poverty and hunger incidence in the area (Sachs, 2005; Pronyk et al., 2012:149; Wanjala and 
Muradian, 2013); Wanjala (2016) noted, however, that in 2014, Siaya county was ranked at that 
time as 10th out of 47 counties in terms of poverty which means that there were several other 
poorer counties than Siaya county (Wanjala, 2016:8). 
This triggers a probing question: how did MVP land in Sauri? A well-informed respondent in 
Sauri explained that when ICRAF started research in Sauri in the early 1990s on soil fertility as 
                                                 
6Victoria Schlesinger is a writer, reporter, and editor who published a story about Sauri Millennium Village Project 
in 2007 in Harper's Magazine (http://www.vschlesinger.com/2013/06/23/harpers-magazine-the-continuation-of-
poverty-the-rebranding-of-foreign-aid-in-kenya/) 
23 
 
part of ongoing research in western Kenya at that time, there were key personalities involved 
with the community. He told how the research was led by Dr. Niang Amadou, a Senegalese 
Principal Forester who was charged with the responsibility of developing methods for speeding 
up the adoption of agro-forestry innovations (see also Place et al., 2007a). He brought the idea 
of improved fallow technology to Luero village, one of the 11 villages in Sauri sub-location 
(Figure 2) (Mango, 2002). In 1997, according to our informant, Dr. Amadou’s boss, Professor 
Pedro Sanchez got personally involved in the agro-forestry research activities that were ongoing 
in the area. 
Professor Pedro Sanchez was the director general of ICRAF at that time (1991-2001) and later 
on became the director of the MVP between 2004 and 2010. He was also the co-chair of the 
United Nations Millennium Village Project Hunger Task Force from 2002-2005 (Earth-
Institute, n.d)7. Our key-informant explained that Professor Sanchez worked with them for 
about three years but before he left ICRAF he promised the farmers that he would come back 
with more development interventions. The local people organised a farewell party for him 
where he was crowned the Chief and named Odera Akang’o, after a famous chief who ruled 
during the colonial period. In 2004 Professor Sanchez returned with Professor Jeffrey Sachs, 
his colleagues from Earth Institute as well as a delegation of donors from the private sector and 
non-profit organizations to launch the MVP in Sauri. The people we interviewed in 2014 still 
had vivid memories of that event of 10 years before. Newspaper clippings and photographs of 
‘villagers’ with Sachs and Sanchez were proudly shown to us. 
In his book, Jeffrey Sachs notes that together with the ‘villagers’ and the UN Millennium 
Project, they identified the ‘big five’ development interventions that would set the Sauri 
                                                 
7 This information is available on the website of the Agriculture and Food Security Centre of Earth Institute, 
Columbia University: http://agriculture.columbia.edu/. 
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community on a progressive development path. These are: (1) providing modern agricultural 
inputs, (2) investments in basic health, and (3) education, (4) energy, transport and 
communication services, (5) safe drinking water and sanitation. These ‘big five’ interventions 
were claimed to have been identified together with the ‘villagers' who were assembled to 
respond to pre-prepared questions concerning their wants, desires, and needs that would reflect 
the eight MDGs (Sachs, 2005: 232-235). Sachs described the appearance of the ‘villagers' as 
thin, malnourished and ill (ibid. 227) which constitutes ‘labelling’ and ‘framing’ as discussed 
earlier in the paper. By the time Jeffrey Sachs arrived in Sauri, plans had already been made on 
how to ‘develop’ Sauri; the visit was only for documentation purposes. 
Even though the MVP was intended to be initiated in a ‘poor’ area in order to prove the 
feasibility and effectiveness of village-level interventions, the sequence of events that occurred 
before the implementation of the project in Sauri confirms that the choice for the MVP location 
was influenced by the designers’ knowledge of the area and their experience working with the 
local people of Sauri. Interestingly, some of the staff who joined MVP and used to work 
previously with ICRAF, advocated the use of agro-forestry technologies (which required the 
use of non-commoditised biologically reproducible resources) in soil fertility replenishment as 
more effective. For instance, Sanchez (1999, 2002) suggested that the most effective and 
appropriate approach to soil replenishment, one that can help improve the current African 
conditions better than those used during the Green Revolution, is a combination of improved 
fallows, phosphorous and biomass transfer, because they are ‘low-tech' and knowledge 
intensive technologies (Sanchez, 2002: 2020). However, upon joining MVP, Sanchez’ focus 
shifted to the use of inorganic fertilizers (and hybrid maize instead of locally adapted 
germplasm), which are commoditised resources, to improve soil fertility and raise productivity 
of land and labour. 
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MVP chose the project site, as Schlesinger (2007) points out, as an area that was more likely to 
succeed and become a good example of the possibility of poverty eradication during ‘our time’ 
as envisioned by Sachs (2005) and his followers. The MVP designers should have, instead, 
opted for an area in dire poverty or, even better, one with much less intervention history so that 
it could exemplify the problem in-depth. Since many villages in Sauri sub- location have had 
the experience of interacting with external development programmes and their agents and given 
that the area is not that badly off as compared to many other ‘poor areas' in Kenya, one could 
as well say that the project was foreseen or rather expected to be a success in such a location 
(Schlesinger, 2007: 3). SMV was, therefore, the result of a rather subjective choice of site.  
 
5.2 SMV’s agricultural interventions  
SMV enthusiastically began with a baseline survey in 2004 along with demonstrations on the 
proper way of using the hybrid technologies such as the agronomic practices. Different types 
of hybrid seeds were planted in the demonstration farms during the short season in order for the 
farmers to learn from and choose the types of hybrid seeds to plant during the long season. The 
community was also organised in to groups/sectors to facilitate the implementation of MVP 
and these included the agricultural sector. In 2005 the farmers were given free inputs, hybrid 
seeds and the fertilizers they preferred. Some of the farmers took the inputs and sold them to 
neighbouring villages as one of the community members pointed out to us: 
‘most of these fertilizers the community members were receiving from SMV did not go 
into good use. I know of some people here who would get the fertilizers and sell them to 
the neighbouring villages, to serious farmers there’.  
Not all ‘village people’ are farmers. Nonetheless, after the long rains in 2005, the farmers 
realised a bumper harvest of maize which was highly praised. Government high ranking 
officials accompanied by Jeffrey Sachs and his team from the Earth Institute travelled to Sauri 
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to celebrate the bumper harvest during a big festival (Mutuo et al. 2006). That was the first and 
last one ever witnessed in Sauri as many of our respondents pointed out. The subsequent 
distribution of inputs was corrupted as one villager commented: 
‘Sometimes inputs and seeds would be brought to be shared among the farmers in the right 
proportion, but you would find that some people would get nothing or get far much less 
than others. There was a lot of discrimination and corruption and even at time the free 
inputs were given for money which was not right’. 
The farmers were also given improved fallow seeds with the promise that the project would buy 
the seeds from them. The first time the farmers had the seeds many of them made a lot of money 
from the seeds. However, once the project stopped buying the seeds, the farmers stopped 
planting the fallow trees by 2009 even though they contributed to soil fertility replenishment. 
One of the key informants, a former SMV member of staff, criticised the strategy they used to 
get farmers to adopt to fallow technology. She said  
‘the approach given to the ICRAF seeds that we gave to the farmers was wrong. They were 
told that the seeds would be bought once they were ready and during the time that the seeds 
were being bought from the farmers, the farmers planted lots of fallow trees but once the 
seeds were no longer being bought, the farmers stopped planting them. I had a big problem 
in the villages because of the fallows. Some farmers still plant them, especially the lead 
farmers, but most of them have stopped planting’.  
The farmers were enticed by the financial gains from the fallow trees and particularly the market 
for seeds that ICRAF had created, and, mostly, did not adopt this strategy for the intended 
purposes (see also Place et al. 2007a, 2007b; Mango and Hebinck, 2016). 
In order to smoothen the adoption of MVP-ideas and technologies and to beneficially transform 
Sauri from a ‘traditional’ to a ‘modern’ entrepreneurial society, the MVP set out to reshape the 
27 
 
way the community organised themselves. The maize technologies (hybrid maize and inorganic 
fertilizers) were at first distributed for free and then offered on condition that the community 
members organised themselves into formal groups or cooperatives to access the inputs and to 
market their produce. This attempt ignored local peoples’ own agency and their attempts to 
strengthen their own local ways of social organisation, marketing, and exchange of produce and 
seeds. To some extent, the ‘free gift' approach as a strategy to get farmers to adopt new 
technologies ignited a ‘dependency syndrome' among the farmers who thought that MVP was 
there to stay and that they would continue getting free inputs. A farmer noted that  
‘we got used to the free fertilizers and seeds and we did not know that it would come to an 
end so soon since they had told us they were going to be with us till 2015’.  
After the withdrawal of the ‘free gifts', most poor farmers could not continue to engage with 
the MVP-desired development strategy. They, in contrast to the better-off farmers and those in 
strategic positions of power, distanced themselves from MVP and actively re-engaged with 
local ways of production and organisation. Interestingly, the MVP's intention to transform Sauri 
facilitated the emergence of assemblages that were desired by its protagonists, but at the same 
time, it gave way to assemblages that centre on the use of locally available resources and 
cultural repertoires (Hebinck et al., 2015).  
In an effort to get farmers a collective bargain and better markets, MVP introduced a 
Cooperative System of marketing and grouped farmers according to their status. The project 
sought to organise farmers more formally towards entrepreneurship that would lead to increase 
in incomes. This formal organisation would replace the long existing informal forms of 
exchanges. The farmers were taught how to keep records throughout the production in an effort 
to turn their farming in to a commercial venture. The Cooperative System was introduced after 
earlier attempts to link farmers to micro-financial institutions such as SAGA, table banking, 
and cereal banking failed due to non-repayments of loans. Farmers feared losing their assets 
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that were registered as collaterals in case of failure to repay the loans. The debts created through 
loans were intended to compel the farmers to sell their produce and get cash to repay the loans.  
A Market Service Centre (MSC) was established in 2011 that housed a total of 8 cooperatives 
which consisted of grain and other producer cooperatives. The cooperatives include Kilimo ni 
Uhai and Indigent Grain Cooperatives, Gem Horticultural Cooperative, Fish Farming 
Cooperative, Poultry Cooperatives and Beekeeping and Honey processing Cooperatives. The 
Indigent Cooperative was meant for the vulnerable farmers who could not afford to purchase 
inputs. They would receive 25 kg of DAP (fertilizers), 6 kg of hybrid seeds and 25 kg of Urea 
(for top dressing) through credit. They were required to pay back with a bag of maize (90 kg) 
after harvesting. These inputs were way too little for the farmers' needs and thus they would be 
made to purchase more inputs, or else use fewer inputs. Additionally, the farmers were expected 
to give an 10 extra kg of maize during repayment for transportation. The repayment process 
always involved force to some extent. The debt collectors, who were also members of the 
community, would take it upon themselves to assess the farmer’s harvest from the farmers’ 
stores and extract the number of bags or gorogoros that the farmer was indebted as the 
cooperative input loan. They would force their way in whenever a farmer tried to resist. And 
the farmers felt that they were being harassed by the debt collectors. This contributed to more 
friction within the community. 
Horticultural farmers were also introduced to greenhouse technology in 2010 and given loans 
to facilitate the acquisition of the greenhouses. This technology did not do well and most of the 
greenhouses stood empty after a while, fell apart or were used for other purposes such as storing 
bricks. The SMV field officers were pushed by SMV to make sure that the farmers adopted this 
technology. As one of the SMV field officer, whom we informally interviewed noted  
‘farmers were kind of being forced into these technologies. Look, for instance, [at] 
something like greenhouses technology; when it was introduced in 2010, some farmers 
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were very excited to have them because we explained to them how to manage the 
greenhouses and the kind of good harvests they could obtain from them. But when the 
farmers were given to manage them, most of them lost interest and said they did not want 
greenhouses anymore. We, as the field officers, were instructed to do all we could to make 
the farmers adopt and sustain them. It has been hard’.  
However, some farmers complained about the kind of ‘training’ they got concerning 
greenhouses. One of the farmers said that  
‘They did not really train us on how to operate the greenhouses. They would visit and one 
time when they came here to review, I told them that I was not trained but they said that 
whenever we were invited to their meetings, those were the trainings we received 
(laughing). These are some of the things that discourage us a lot. At times we would find 
that in the meeting, it was one of those companies that make seeds, fertilizers, pesticides 
etc. that would talk about their products. It was not really training.’  
SMV was busy linking the farmers to the markets for accessing input (as far as greenhouses 
were concerned) other than working out the underlying challenges in production. 
As an exit strategy, SMV adopted a lead farmer concept. Active farmers were selected to be a 
source of information for the other farmers. They were trained and advised to open up their 
farms for other farmers to learn from. The Lead Farmer programme was launched in 2013 to 
provide a better alternative for farmers to acquire new techniques for farming. The lead farmers 
were trained in technical, communication and leadership skills and are expected to share with 
others in order to create some change within the community (MDG, 2014:30). The selection 
criteria were contested though. We analyse these agricultural interventions in the section that 
follows.  
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5.3  ‘Our Data, Our Currency...Keep Off!’ 
This subsection highlights the highly secretive MVP data and their questionable project 
evaluation reports that were used to cover the truth about most of the happenings within MVP 
and to paint a picture of success. The MVP reports and more specifically the SMV reports on 
impact evaluations were done in a closed and confidential manner. This raises serious doubts 
about the nature of the data and the kind of realities these reports aimed to convey and to whom. 
Researchers like us who were not associated with the SMV more broadly were not allowed to 
access and make use of SMV data. This greatly prohibited critique of data production, and the 
processing and validation of analysis of impact. Clemens and Demombynes (2013) argue that 
project data requires an interactive process of external critique. By denying visiting scholars 
project related data, independent analyses of the impact of the SMV remain undermined. The 
tendency in the reporting that has been published8 endorses a view of the impact of the project 
that serves the interest of the project bureaucracy so that it can continue to receive funding for 
development work (Clemens and Demombynes, 2013:12). Thus most projects are compelled 
to publish impressive reports even though the reality is different.  
Demombynes (2012) points out that access to data is a major issue in African development 
projects. Most of the data collected is never used again after a single progress report is produced. 
The data is hidden from the public because of its lack of quality or credibility that may trigger 
questions if it is scrutinised by others. Jerven (2010) for instance points out that most statistical 
data on the basis of which development policies are designed and adjusted is unreliable and 
grossly incomplete. 
That most data is hidden because of its deficiencies is certainly true of MVP. The project 
received a lot of criticism on their reports, from its lack of sufficient measures to the lack of 
                                                 
8 Notably in reputable and high impact journals like The Lancet and Science. 
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data to back up the claims of success. Some MVP reports published were found to be 
misleading. At times MVP was made to take back some statements of wrong reporting and to 
rectify mistakes after criticism (Clemens and Demombynes, 2013: 3-7; Pronyk, 2012). How 
about the false and erroneous reports by MVPs at national level that have not been detected? 
Clemens and Demombynes (2013) note that their critical review of MVP reports (Clemens and 
Demombynes, 2011) was only feasible because the Demographic and Health Surveys allowed 
for an independent assessment of MVP assertions of success (Clemens and Demombynes, 
2013: 12). This raises questions as to how the data was collected, ordered and analysed. 
Interestingly, some of the SMV claims of success are rooted in previous interventions 
implemented before the launch of SMV. For instance, the farmers who independently applied 
the Green Revolution package prior to SMV (as documented in Mango, 2002), were presented 
as SMV success stories during visitor tours to the project site and the farmers introduced to the 
visitors as SMV farmers (personal observations and interviews). 
Moreover, only a few reports on SMV have been published. These include the baseline survey 
report (Mutuo et al., 2007) and the first annual report (Mutuo et al., 2006) that reported and 
celebrated the bumper harvests9. These bumper harvests were realised in the 2005/2006 and 
2006/2007 agricultural season, with yields of respectively 4.9 and 6.2 tons per hectare (Mutuo 
et al., 2006: 11; Haro, 2014: 255). The first bumper harvest was celebrated in Sauri on July 21, 
2005, as a major success of SMV and Jeffrey Sachs, representatives of UNESCO, and high 
ranking Kenyan government officials attended the festivities (Mutuo et al., 2006:10). The 
                                                 
9 The notion of bumper harvest is misleading. The yield figures provided in the MVP reports are presented and 
compared with previous years. In addition, the concept yield is one-dimensionally understood and applied: what 
is harvested is measured per unit of land or labour. In contrast, a multidimensional concept of yield we found in 
the villages is that it should include not only what the Annual Report acknowledges as harvested and stored and 
also as green (so-called unripe) maize (Mutuo et al. 2006: 11), but, more importantly in our view, the nutritious 
value of maize. Women in particular point out that their local maize varieties are far more (‘twice as much') 
nutritious than the hybrid maize varieties preferred by MVP (Hebinck et al. 2015; Mango, 2002). It is quite well 
known that local or indigenous varieties of plants can be up to 200% more nutritious than commercially cultivated 
varieties (Committee on World Food Security, nd.) 
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reports do not mention that these yields were, however, only realised during the first two years 
of SMV, the period when farmers received free inputs (e.g. improved hybrid maize seeds and 
inorganic fertilizer) in full during the first year, and a half in the second year of implementation. 
After that yields dropped substantially and the much-heralded yield increases did not continue. 
Many of our informants attested to this during interviews. In line with the MVP-culture of not 
sharing information or data, SMV did not publish any more yield data which would be their 
most highlighted criteria for success. Wanjala (2016) and Wanjala and Muradian (2013) point 
out that the project generated significant increases in yields but no significant increase in 
monetary income. Farmers still talked about those yields which were high at that time 
particularly when compared to the period before SMV implementation. In contrast to Wanjala 
(2016), we find the current situation in Sauri in terms of yields far worse when compared with 
the pre-MVP situation. Some farmers attribute this to the degraded soils, especially after the 
introduction of chemical fertilizers which many believe has deteriorated markedly in quality 
(Mango, 2002: 167). Odongo, one of the farmers Mango interviewed in 2000, stated that the 
fertilizer he has been using since the 1940s has been good until recently, but the quality of 
today's fertilizer does not improve the yield of the maize grown as it did when hybrid maize 
was introduced. On-farm research by CARE and KEFRI confirm this. Abednego, interviewed 
in 2000 by Nelson Mango explained the fertilizer issue as follows: 
‘We lack proper inputs, this is what is causing low productivity. The kind of fertilizer we 
receive nowadays is not good and that is why some farmers say it spoils the soil. I think 
there is something wrong with the fertilizer we receive nowadays. Since we cannot afford 
to buy a whole bag of fertilizer, traders divide fertilizer in this bag into small packages that 
are affordable to us. Maybe during this time, they add other things not known to us’ 
(Mango, 2002: 167). 
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MVP data was not accessible to unscrutinised and ‘unqualified’ researchers who sought their 
data. A key informant told us that in order to gain access to SMV data, one had to be vetted first 
and research objectives had to be assessed before being given any access to data or other support 
by MVP officials. Most of those who got MVP support for their studies usually had their study 
objectives aligned to MVP goals with future results in support of the project’s claims. We 
confirmed this information as correct when we sought access to SMV data ourselves and visited 
the SMV field office in Sauri and the regional office in Kisumu. At the regional office, we were 
advised to send an email that explained our research and the kind of data we needed.. After our 
email requesting copies of annual reports and other data that had been collected over the 
previous five years or so, communications between us and the regional office stopped 
immediately. No response was ever given. We did not qualify to access their data. However, as 
pointed out earlier, we managed informally to access data and some unofficial reports from 
MVP field staff. 
6. Assemblage dynamics and practices 
At least six assemblage practices stand out when considering the dynamics of the MVP 
assemblage as exemplified by SMV. (1) Everyday issues of (un)equal distribution of power, 
socio-political struggles for villagers to decide own futures and whose knowledge and realities 
counts in decision making (Chambers 1983) are isolated from the technical questions. 
Fergusson (1990), Escobar (2011) and Mosse (2005) ascribe depoliticizing effects to this 
process. (2) Depoliticizing or rendering technical not only rearranges and misinterprets local 
realities through applying standardized assessment procedures to legitimise certain 
interventions but simultaneously it obscures alternative solutions and practices. (3) The villages 
and communities are treated as spaces with no histories, with no records of development. (4) 
Previous interventions to transform or improve development conditions are largely ignored like 
the robust, novel practices that emerge at the local level. Apparently, not much has happened 
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in the villages in which there have been interventions over the last so many years and that the 
available collective and individual agency is not taken into account. 5) Rendering technical in 
this way takes the focus of attention away from local dynamics and away from the place and 
context where possible solutions can be found and to an extent are practiced already. (6) After 
the MVP was launched as a high profile project that was deemed too important to fail, it 
produced data and reports, to keep track of its impacts, for internal circulation only and sealed 
off from the broader public. MVP only published positive but questionable reports of its 
successes. Some success stories of farmers turned into entrepreneurial farmers were claimed as 
the result of SMV, while our ex ante-MVP studies reveal that they already embraced such a 
strategy (Mango, 2002). These reports served to sweep its inefficiencies under the carpet and 
were valuable tools to prove and convince the donor community that MDGs are achievable and 
that the continuity of funding over a long period of time is essential. 
The fixing of solutions required the community to be reordered to comply with the formal rules 
for purposes of governing and control. This had major, even dramatic, impacts at the 
community level as we will elaborate in some detail in this section. As a result of MVP 
interventions, the community has experienced a deepening of existing inequalities and conflicts, 
especially due to elite capture of intervention benefits, mainly the agricultural inputs. In 
addition, enmity among the community members crept in generally injuring the social relations 
among the members. This is not to indicate that MVP did not have any positive effects in Sauri. 
In fact, the farmers picked up what they considered important to them and have continued to 
use it, for instance, the land preparation techniques and line planting regardless of whether they 
are planting the local maize varieties or the hybrid seeds. These reassembling practices and the 
dynamics these display are key practices for the analysis of the limits of planned agrarian 
change. 
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The labelling and framing of villagers as ‘hungry, thin and impoverished’ (Sachs, 2005: 227) 
and more importantly, the lumping together of Sauri villagers as a mass of homogeneous 
entities is typical for MVP. A village in Sub-Saharan Africa, however, consists of groups and 
people that are socially differentiated in terms of age, class, and gender. Some of the villagers 
may be influential business-oriented farmers and traders who already engage in global markets 
while others may be small scale farmers who depend on family labour and largely produce for 
themselves and their families, and in case of a surplus, for local markets (Carr, 2008: 336; 
Mango, 2002). Again others engage in multiple livelihoods and spent considerable time in 
urban environments keeping ties with their rural homes (Ramisch, 2014, 2015). 
The MVP assemblage in Sauri seriously lacked context specificity as development is perceived 
to be a universal process as a result of which it cannot adequately cope with complexity (Umans 
and Arce, 2014: 342). The already existing relations in rural development are affected by 
elements inserted into the farmers’ assemblages that mainly appear in the form of capital (e.g. 
loans), knowledge (e.g. modern science) and transfer of technology (e.g. introduction of Green 
Revolution-styled packages). Such insertions disturb and fracture the already existing and 
rooted relational organisations. MVP was more concerned about reproducing a certain ideology 
than the transformation of the relations of poverty and inequality (Wilson, 2016:5). It can be 
argued that the MVP assemblage was actually not so keen to fix solutions but to paint a picture 
of success to exemplify the achievability of the MDGs and this equates to assembling success.  
MVP did not engage in a critical assessment of the previously implemented development-styles. 
Farmers in Sauri were trained in the ‘modern’ ways of farming and supplied with hybrid seeds 
and fertilizers (Mutuo et al., 2006). MVP also reintroduced the use of the fallow technology for 
soil replenishment that was initially introduced by the International Centre for Research in 
Agro-forestry (ICRAF) in the mid-1990s (Kiptot et al., 2006; Kiptot et al., 2007; Mutuo et al., 
2006; Sanchez, 1999), forming a continuation of the same and taking along with it ICRAF’s 
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failures to install agro-forestry techniques within the farming community (Kiptot et al., 2006; 
Kiptot et al., 2007; Place et al., 2007a, 2007b; Mango and Hebinck, 2016). 
The strategy of SMV to fix solutions for the perceived need for formal channels of distribution 
such as the cooperatives and the cereal banking schemes had dramatic results. By the time of 
this study, most farmers had distanced themselves from the Cooperative System. According to 
the manager of the indigent cooperative society, about half of the cooperative members 
withdrew within a year after joining the cooperative. He said  
“when we started the indigent cooperative, there were 4000 members from Sauri cluster 
but now we are around 2000 members. One of the reasons for drop out is that there are 
joyriders; people who are not ready for the program. They do not use the inputs they are 
given but instead sell them immediately they receive them. They thus do not get to pay 
back the one bag of maize expected from them. I think it’s a complex thing about how 
people behave. Others use them well, get good harvests but fail to pay back and thus they 
are disqualified from the cooperatives”. 
In the same vein, the cereal banking scheme that preceded the Cooperative System was 
established to make it possible for farmers to reap the benefits of receiving higher prices for 
their grains after cumulative storage (Sanchez et al., 2009: 39; See also Wanjala, 2016:133-
135). However, this never worked out. Only one of the initial 11 cereal banks introduced in the 
11 villages was still operational in 2009 (Wanjala, 2016: 134) and by the time of our research 
in Sauri, there was no cereal bank. Due to mistrust, abuse of power and corruption of the 
members of the community responsible for the cereal banking operations, it collapsed causing 
massive loss of maize grains to the farmers. Various actors who engaged with the cereal bank 
had their own diverging interests. Conflicts erupted, exposing deep rooted historical differences 
and inequalities within the community. Many of our respondents cited abuse of power by those 
in leadership positions as the main reason for the disintegration of the community structures 
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and member withdrawals from the cereal banking system. Joseph, who was in charge of the 
Sauri Community Centre that initially housed the cereal bank stated that  
“when the cereal bank was established, we collected 1075 bags of maize and the MVP 
promised to give us additional Kshs. 100,000 (approx. $ 1000) for buying more maize from 
the farmers to add to the bags we had collected and then they would sell the maize for us. 
Our maize was sold and we never got anything. These Millennium people really 
disappointed us. People then refused the whole thing about cereal banking. Farmers had 
already contributed with varying quantities of maize wholeheartedly and with much hope 
for benefits. I lost five bags of maize that time to the ‘cereal bank’, it was painful”. 
One thing that MVP did not realize is that not all community members are agricultural 
entrepreneurs. Some cultivate maize to feed themselves while others are more inclined to be 
entrepreneurial and actively sell their surpluses. Maize cultivation also has an important 
symbolic role (Ramisch, 2014: 22; Cohen and Atieno-Odiambho, 1989; Hebinck et al., 2015) 
such that some farmers plant maize to fulfil the expectations of the community as everyone is 
expected to cultivate the land to feed their families. In the effort to ‘enlighten’ farmers and to 
‘make’ them entrepreneurs, MVP unintentionally opened doors for corruption, social exclusion, 
and mistrust. 
SMV activities were liable to elite capture of inputs that passed unnoticed. At the onset of the 
project, all farmers within the MVP village were eligible for free hybrid seeds and fertilizers 
that reduced to half the following year and was scrapped to give way to self-reliance during the 
third year of the project. The farmers were introduced to the credit systems along with the 
reduction of the supply of free inputs. Those who could not afford to repay the loans quit the 
arrangement. The better-off farmers with relatively large plots of land benefitted more from the 
whole credit arrangement because they could afford to buy the required subsidized inputs. In 
fact, one of them stated that  
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“I have never planted without the use of fertilizers because I always have the money to buy 
them. I do not really understand why my neighbours keep claiming that fertilizers are too 
expensive and yet the soils are so depleted such that without fertilizers one cannot get any 
good harvest”.  
The hybrid package was thus more applicable to the able farmers with alternative cash income 
but not to the poorest ones. On the other hand, the elites had an upper hand in access to inputs 
and Joseph pointed out that  
“the members of indigent cooperative society are supposed to be the vulnerable members 
of the community who cannot afford to buy inputs by themselves, but you will find other 
well-up people benefitting from this, even a full professor”.  
The soils of the poor farmers deteriorated from the initial use of the free fertilizers from SMV. 
Eventually, they could not harvest as much as they used to when they planted without fertilizers 
before MVP implementation. Since they reverted to planting the local maize varieties, their 
seeds could not yield as much without fertilizers and yet they could not afford them. The 
benefits of the schemes set out to help the vulnerable ended up benefitting the wealthier 
members who could corrupt their ways out through privileged access to key resources. Thus 
the intended benefits of the project did not really trickle down to the neediest people in the 
villages, contributing to further class division.  
The way SMV was implemented intensified the relations of power inequalities and conflicts 
that existed. For instance, in Sauri two prominent clans make up the social fabric: the Kalanyo 
and the Kathomo clan, which have had differences historically. It is said that the Kathomo clan 
is not originally from Sauri but migrated from another part of Siaya region known as Wagai. 
The Kathomo clan members are said to be more aggressive in leading and grabbing other 
opportunities that come their way. The Kalanyo clan members make up the majority members 
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of the community, and it is claimed that they are less aggressive compared to the Kathomo clan 
members. From this perceived narrative, the SMV provided an opportunity for the Kathomos 
to exercise their aggressiveness and rise into positions of power, something that did not go down 
well with the larger clan. The Kalanyo clan is blamed for trying to prevent other clans from 
becoming involved in any development activities within the community, with claims that the 
area is originally theirs.10 The informants pointed out that, when MVP was implemented, these 
conflicts became worse and people accused each other of many wrong doings. The Kathomos 
managed to manoeuvre themselves in positions of power and most of them became lead farmers 
who usually were the first to receive information from MVP. In most cases, that information 
was relayed only to the farmers within their lineage. Quite a few farmers complained that 
‘things were just happening and no one bothered to update them’. Meetings would be held, 
decisions made and the farmers would not know of it except for a few well connected farmers. 
The passing of such information was selectively done by those in charge. Only a few farmers 
would be informed to attend meetings. One of the farmers, for instance, explained to us that 
some white small groundnuts were given for distribution among the farmers but only a few who 
were informed about it received them. Some leaders kept the groundnuts for themselves and 
only shared with their close friends and relatives. This resembles situations of corruption during 
the implementation of ICRAF’s Agro-forestry programmes during the 1990s and early 2000’s. 
Community leaders were accused of keeping the imported rock phosphate for themselves or for 
sale. The accusation were real and observed by Mango and Hebinck during fieldwork in 2004 
in Sauri (see also Mango, 2002: 268-270). 
                                                 
10 This is part of the complex history of settlement that followed the migration of the Luo from Southern Sudan 
into what is now west Kenya (or Luoland). See Mango (2002: 35-380). Clans were engaged in fights over control 
of the new territory. These sentiments still play a role to date. 
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Situations like these exacerbated the existing enmity amongst and between people in the village 
to an extent that people were not talking to each other anymore. The community was also 
involved in bitter conflicts over leadership within the MVP structure. This is in contrast to 
situations before MVP set foot in Sauri and prior to similar programmes such as those managed 
and implemented by ICRAF. In situations of conflict over certain issues (e.g. such as those over 
land, not sharing resources) but still people talked to each other and engaged in some activities 
together (Hebinck and Mango, 2008; see also Haro, 2014: 341-349)  
Additionally, the use of the hierarchical structure of the community intensified the existing 
inequalities amongst and between people in the village. The leaders such as chiefs, assistant 
chiefs or headmen as well as community elites are in more powerful positions than other 
members of the community and they are mostly the community gatekeepers. The project goods 
and services flow along those lines. Most development projects connect with these power 
holders to parachute their project ideas and to push transformation in ways the project desires. 
This relationship benefits those people in power who are economically endowed as well as their 
close allies which results in unequal sharing in the community. This also explains why the so-
called unintended consequences such as ‘elite capture’ occur during project implementation 
(Platteau, 2004; Panda, 2014; Rigon, 2014). 
Some of the strategies SMV used as sustainability measures resulted in more tensions, jealousy, 
and undermining of social relations. The MVP adopted the ICRAF style of investing in a few 
community members to act as examples and as lead farmers from whom other community 
members would learn and who they would emulate (Kiptot et al., 2006: 168). MVP adopted the 
lead or master farmer concept and launched it in 2013 to ensure that innovations (e.g. new 
farming techniques) that were introduced would trickle down. The lead farmers were 
specifically trained in technical, communication and leadership skills with the hope of ensuring 
sustainability (MDG, 2014). ICRAF had set up such arrangement to facilitate the adoption of 
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fallow tree agro-forestry technology. During our ex-ante studies, these lead farmers were 
famously called ‘ICRAF-agents’. They were easy to spot in the landscape as most 4x4 tracks 
would lead to their homesteads, tracks along which celebrities like ambassadors and ministers 
would drive to visit their fields (Mango, 2002; Place et al. 2007b). They attended seminars and 
workshops and selected those who were to attend meetings and as well as seminars. People did 
not like the ‘agents' as they were given preferential treatment by NGO's and donor agencies but 
liked the ICRAF staff because they were getting free inputs from them (Place et al., 2007b). 
The approach of picking a few farmers to work with them created tensions among the 
community members. These farmers were seen as having been favoured, a perception that 
aroused jealousy in the community hence upsetting existing social relationships (Mango, 2002; 
Place et al., 2005). This strategy had previously caused a stir among the community members 
who cited favouritism of ICRAF towards the ‘ICRAF-agents’ whose selection again was linked 
to a network of kinship relations and patronage. It yielded similar results as before.  
The Solution-Fix of MVP is evident in the choice of what key agricultural resources to 
introduce to meet the targets and objectives of MVP and the MDGs. Whereas MVP opted for 
an approach inspired by the Green Revolution that hinges on introducing and spreading the 
application of commoditised resources (e.g. hybrid maize, inorganic fertilizer), the predominant 
tendency in Sauri and surrounding villages is that people continue to rely on locally produced, 
enriched and exchanged ‘local’ maize seeds and farmyard manure. In times of food insecurity, 
pressure on monetary incomes, malfunctioning markets, the introduction of resources that do 
not resonate with the local socio-ecological environments is not conducive to attempts to 
enhance rural livelihoods. The introduction of such resources does not contribute to or support 
the need for farmers and their families to set an independent pace for themselves that hinges on 
(re)building and relying on their own social networks and (re)producing their own productive 
resources. This is very much like the struggle for (relative) autonomy in order to reduce 
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dependency that is so characteristic of peasant forms of production (Van der Ploeg, 2010). 
Farmers in Sauri now struggle to distance themselves from the market and input supply markets 
and cooperatives that were introduced by MVP; instead they re-engage with the resources they 
know and can easily access and exchange amongst themselves without engaging with 
commodity markets. These resources, and notably the local maize varieties are trusted and their 
use embedded in the local cultural repertoires; more importantly perhaps is that they are found 
to be more tasty, nutritious and easier to plant when compared to improved maize seed (Mango, 
2002; Hebinck et al., 2015). Farmers realized especially that the marketing cooperatives and 
loaning schemes could not adequately address their problems. In fact, according to many 
respondents, the farmers experienced a great loss when operating through the formal systems 
introduced by experts, the state and donor organisations (Haro, 2014). Some of them thus chose 
to disengage and form their own groups that they thought would be more beneficial in the end.  
7. Conclusion 
This paper has explored, from an assemblage perspective, the implementation of the 
Millennium Villages Project (MVP) in Sauri. The assemblage that emanated from the desire to 
accelerate the achievement of the MDG’s is characterised by great discrepancies between policy 
objectives and implementation, and between planning and the existing everyday realities in the 
villages. The SMV assembled elements in such a way that it extended the modernisation of 
development discourse that has been in existence for decades. Centrally and externally 
coordinated interventions‘ from above’, bound by time and budget and guided by a practice that 
aim to fix solutions that rarely resonates with the predominant local conditions, are often 
ineffective, inefficient and short lasting. MVP as exemplified by SMV unfolded as a 
continuation of the preceding and globally applied and implemented development strategies 
such as IRD, SAP and the Green Revolution.  
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We also showed that the MVP strategy to accelerate achieving the MDGs did not generate 
lasting, sustainable transformations, thus ‘twisting’ its application of the fixing of solutions. 
Our analysis points to a set of problematic strategies that are hidden within the fixing practice 
and to a haste to assemble success for exemplification purposes. Claiming success was 
facilitated (in part) by the subjective choice of the ‘right’ site for the project implementation 
and distribution of free inputs. This forging of alignments and the management of failures of 
the assemblage through questionable reporting of success stories and data secrecy emerge as 
typical for the SMV assemblage. The reporting specifically serves as a cover up for the failure 
to achieve stated objectives and an attempt to secure funds to extend and intensify the MVP 
approach. The MVP-style of working in Sauri created many tensions and rifts within the 
community. We have shown how it elicited favouritism, facilitated the elite capture of input, 
an exacerbation of existing inequalities with a resultant fracturing of the community. The 
questionable reporting of the project results constitutes a display of ignorance about what was 
really happening in a locale where the modernising of rural communities through rendering 
technical was met with suspicion, rejection, active engagement and a reassembling of 
introduced ideas and technologies.  
We have argued that the unpredictability of ‘assemblage practices’ need to be taken into 
account. We showed, for instance, that SMV generated contradictory processes that evolved 
side by side. While SMV created opportunities for elite capture it simultaneously created space 
for a continuation of localised assembled forms of modernity. These latter phenomena pivot in 
villages like Sauri on gaining and regaining strength in the generation and enrichment of locally 
available resources such as the use of local seed varieties and farmyard manure. Processes of 
commoditisation occur alongside processes of non-commoditisation. The former requires 
entrepreneurship as preferred by SMV; the latter requires developing locally accepted and 
adapted skills that provide some historical continuities. The experience of MVP in Sauri 
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reiterates that agrarian change is non-linear and produces contrasting trajectories of change. 
Social change cannot simply be engineered and planned. Outcomes cannot simply be measured 
by the degree of adoption of externally introduced resources such as technologies and 
institutions.  
The value of viewing MVP and related interventions through an assemblage lens is that it allows 
a clear understanding of why this is and why reassembling is an important practice of 
assemblages we need to take into consideration. Change - or development - is mediated through 
social processes such as local values, historically rooted experiences and cultural repertoires. It 
is also mediated by the intensity and nature of the interactions between experts and other 
interveners with the so-called ‘target’ communities and the inherent encounter of scientific and 
local bodies of knowledge. Perhaps we have to come to terms with the fact that agrarian 
transformation largely, though not exclusively, comes from within. Despite the intended 
stabilising effect of MVP on Sauri’s socio-technical fabric, robust or promising assemblages 
continue to emerge that hinge on localised cultural repertoires and institutions as well as on a 
strong belief in the locally available resources such as local maize varieties and soil fertility 
replenishment practices. Our longitudinal studies confirm that farmers even after initial 
enthusiasm continue to trust and rely on using and enriching their own resources whose use is 
embedded in locally shared and accepted cultural norms, in order for them to reproduce what 
they can and share among themselves. Hence we argue for these factors to be regarded as 
relevant, productive and useful as starting points for a ‘fit-in-context’ approach to pursuing 
development rather than through interventions. This would render assemblages that potentially 
appreciate fully the capabilities of human and non-human actors within the villages. Such 
assemblages do not relate to the villages as external actors. 
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